Fenómeno, preconcepción y acción en Sexto Empírico

Abstract

Sextus Empiricus claims that the skeptic lives attending to what is shown, τὸ φαινόμενον, in accordance with the practical observance of ordinary life, κατὰ τὴν βιωτικήν, without dogmatism, ἀδοξάστως (HP I, 23). He also affirm that the skeptic does not live in accordance with philosophical discourse, κατὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον λόγον, for with regard to it the skeptic remain inactive, ἀνενέργητος, but is capable to choose some things and reject others in accordance with the practical nonphilosopical observance, κατὰ τὴν ἀφιλόσοφον τήρησιν (M XI, 165). This seems to be based on not add to what’s shown additional philosophical belief, οὐδὲν ἔξωθεν τούτῳ προσδοξάζει (M XI, 166). In this context has been traditionally problematic the scope of the term ἀδοξάστως. This article seeks to clarify the concept of preconception (προλήψις) in the work of Sextus Empiricus, and to highlight the possibility of action consistent with the principles of the skeptical philosophy as he presents them.