El acto libre. Un análisis fenomenológico desde Edmund Husserl

Abstract

Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is not only an epistemological reflection on the foundations of science and knowledge. In his latter years he was dedicated to the investigation of problems like history, ethics or anthropology. I will try to show in this paper how can be established a phenomenological approach to the philosophical problem of ‘freedom’. For phenomenology, there is no such a thing as an ‘antinomy’ when we are talking about ‘freedom’. Freedom is a simple fact that we must accept and suppose when we have an experience about our subjective actions. From my point of view, Husserl’s phenomenology is capable of providing the conceptual tools that become necessary to offer a comprehensive and philosophical vision of freedom. The essential point is the phenomenological distinction between ‘causality’ and ‘motivation’. The first one is the relation that rules nature facts and the second represents the legality under which the life of subjectivity is given. This way, the ‘free act’ shows itself as the fact that founds all ethic reflection.