A Philosophical Critique of Freedom in Milton Friedman's Works: Examining the Conceptual Foundations and Contemporary Challenges to Economic Libertarianism

Abstract

This paper presents a comprehensive philosophical critique of Milton Friedman's conception of freedom as articulated in his seminal works, particularly Capitalism and Freedom (1962) and Free to Choose (1980). Through an examination of contemporary philosophical literature on liberty, power dynamics, and structural critique, this analysis argues that Friedman's conceptualization of freedom suffers from fundamental theoretical inadequacies. The paper demonstrates that Friedman's negative conception of freedom fails to account for structural domination, power asymmetries, and the complex relationship between economic arrangements and genuine human agency. Drawing upon recent scholarship in republican theory, critical philosophy, and structural analysis, this critique reveals how Friedman's framework inadvertently legitimizes forms of coercion and domination that contradict his stated commitment to human freedom.