La percepción como criterio en Epicuro

Abstract

Rooted always in his conception of the physical world, materialistic Epicureanism presents an interesting explanation of how to access knowledge, showing how the sensations are the starting point and, in turn, the criteria by which we judge something as true or false. It would be a mistake to judge the ancient science from our current knowledge; on the contrary, it is of great value to understand to what kind of phenomenon the presented theories responded. In order to show the origin and scope of the theory of perception of Epicurus, I propose, first, to present some rudiments of his physics with emphasis on the atoms and the vacuum. I will discuss later Epicurean theory of perception, and then relate it to the epistemology and show the role of feelings as a criterion of truth. Finally, I will conclude by pointing out some differences with other Hellenistic schools. I will refer particularly to the Epicureans refutation of skepticism, and will elaborate a possible answer to the objections of Plutarch against the theory of perception of the Epicureans, marking the differences between the approaches of the Epicureans and the Cyrenaics, differences that Plutarch seems to overlook.