El nuevo cogito de E. Sosa: juicio e imagen en la geografía lógica del sueño

Abstract

According to the orthodox conception (supposedly Cartesian), the indiscernibility between sleep and feeling legitimizes an extreme skepticism that dissociates our experiences of their causal links and their epistemological foundations. Ernest Sosa opposes to it an imaginative model: while we dream our cognitive process is disabled. This would involve, among other things: (i) to attribute to the subject two contradictory belief systems; (ii) require moral responsibility for what you choose in a dream; and (iii), extend the skepticism until the very fact of judge and thought. We intend to show: (i) how the Cartesian model neither is identifiable with the orthodox nor logically away from the imaginative model; (ii) how it allows to detect in Sosa’s extention of the cogito a fallacy by mistake; (iii) finally, that it can safeguard the soundness of the cogito, while avoiding committing to a phenomenalist ontology and the challenge of perceptive skepticism.