Wittgenstein, ¿monista?

La visión aspectual como clave para solucionar el problema mente-cuerpo

Abstract

In Blue Book and Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein seems to defend some kind of conductism. Along with it we can find a hard critic to both dualism and monism. What is then Wittgenstein’s conception of mind and body (or the brain), as well as their mutual relationships? Even though it is difficult to reconstruct his precise stance about the mind-body problem, it is possible to show, in the first place, that Wittgenstein’s conductism is not so, at least not in a traditional or reductionist sense. Wittgenstein considers mind and body not as different interacting «objects», but as the same reality to which we refer to through two different language games: the mental and the physical. This is why the «aspectual vision» turns out to be an indispensable tool to understand this interaction of language games in the description of human beings.