

A Century of Romanian Philosophy

DR. MATTEI SIMANDAN

Associate Professor, "Aurel Vlaicu", University Arad, Romania

PRESENTACIÓN

Este trabajo intenta sintetizar las principales contribuciones de los filósofos rumanos que influyeron significativamente en el debate intelectual del siglo XX. Después de una breve presentación de la situación peculiar de la investigación filosófica rumana se pasa a examinar una serie de temas que, desde el punto de vista del autor, son realmente importantes para estudiar la génesis, el desarrollo y la transformación de diferentes ideas filosóficas. Entre ellos se subrayan algunos aspectos de los fundamentos del conocimiento y la teoría de los "contornos vacíos" de Titu Maiorescu, otros de la ontología y de la metafísica de Vasile Conta y Petre P. Negulescu y otros relacionados con el "personalismo energético" desarrollado por Constantin Radulescu-Motru. La filosofía del conocimiento y el problema de la reconstrucción filosófica se examinan en relación con el trabajo teórico de Mircea Florian. Enseguida se analiza el trabajo de D. D. Rosca acerca de las dimensiones filosóficas de la existencia humana. El trabajo de Lucian Blaga ha tenido impacto en varias áreas de la filosofía, pero aquí sólo se intenta decodificar los significados de su interesante proyecto metafísico, exponiendo los principales conceptos de sus tesis. La última parte analiza los temas fundamentales de la filosofía de los valores de Tudor Vianu y los del proyecto de lo que sus exegetas llaman "un nuevo paradigma de construcción ontológica" de Constantin Noica.

Genaro Zalpa (Departamento de Sociología, UAA)

1. INTRODUCTION

From the outset we should say that in order to understand a philosophical view, the researcher must deal firstly with its determiners, that is to say that he has to decode its genesis, to extract then the new and specific matter which it deals with, to point out its internal articulations and finally to make up value judgements related to the proposed solutions. In other words, in the history of philosophy the explanation is intimately related to the analysis of the ideas of a conception and it includes both the moment of the genesis of ideas and that of the critical evaluation and its signification. From here it follows that the explanation in the history of the philosophical ideas requires the pointing out and the charting of the elements and the facts of the culture of an epoch and also of a thinker's work.

These help us to understand the genesis and the articulations peculiar to a conception, its major meanings, its value and its limits, and the contribution it makes to the progress of the philosophical knowledge and to the affirmation of an ideal of life. No less important is the fact that philosophy has been exposed to reconsiderations and re-evaluations of the valuable ideas of one author or another. Finally, it must be noticed that a scientific approach to the contributions of the main philosophical representatives has to take into account both the original elaborations and the development due to the peculiar historical conditions of a culture.

Before going on with the proper debate of these contributions I would remind that Romanian philosophy has unfolded its personality and self-consciousness confronting time. After the foundation of the Romanian national state (1859) and after the reforms, which promoted the development of capitalist relationships, philosophy came in contact with different preoccupations and views. The foundation of the universities of Iasi (1860) and Bucharest (1864), of the Romanian Academy (1866) and of numerous scientific societies during the general process of modernization of the Romanian society had been of paramount importance for the development of Romanian philosophy. Another great moment is represented by the Great Unification (1918) which gave a strong impulse to economy, culture, science and education and also to promoting an impressive exchange of material and spiritual

values. Thus, the Romanian philosophy was permanently connected to the great debates of ideas, which dominated one period, or another of the European intellectual history. Its representatives elaborated works with countless elements of originality, but also with influences from philosophers from other cultures. The strongest prove is the fact that its field of preoccupations includes contributions to all of the classical fields of the philosophical reflection: logic, ontology, the theory of knowledge, aesthetics, the philosophy of culture, social philosophy, the philosophy of science, anthropological philosophy and moral philosophy. In line with the aforementioned considerations upon the peculiarity of the present work, I would make the following observations: firstly, for the discussion which follows there were considered only those philosophers whose creation was finished; secondly, I judged it much more useful to insist especially on the study of the genesis and transformations in time of the different views of thought analyzed, without referring to the biographies of the philosophers or to the presentation of the historical condition in which they elaborated their views. Finally, because of the diversity of the philosophical fields studied by the majority of the thinkers analyzed, I tried to discern especially the facets of direct relevance to philosophy, even if they include multi-disciplinary openings.

With this final remark, I will start the successive examination of the main ideas, theses and philosophical theories promoted by: T. Maiorescu, V. Conta, P.P. Negulescu, C. Rădulescu-Motru, M. Florian, L. Blaga, D. D. Rosca, T. Vianu and C. Noica.

In the final part, I will conclude by summing up the impact of "a century of Romanian philosophy" upon the new generation of contemporary thinkers devoted to philosophy and to reflexivity in the sphere of the humanities and social sciences.

2. TITU MAIORESCU AND THE SPECIFICITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE

Titu Maiorescu (1840-1918) developed his activity in many fields: philosophy, cultural theory, aesthetics, literary criticism and politics. In the particular field of philosophy, he maintained a view characterized by an specific realism. By criticizing the positivist limitation of knowledge to what is given, he showed that philosophy stands

prominently for the progress of culture. Măiorescu brought arguments to prove that between science and metaphysics there is no unpassing gaps but a dynamic relationship. On the basis of scientific knowledge, philosophy anticipates the ideas which, lately, will be changed by science into knowledge. In the evolving process from unknown to known, some knowledge considered just hypothetical will pass from the metaphysical field into the scientific one. More than that, between knowledge and action, between science and the practical life, he sees an organic unity and a "mutual help" and not at all an antagonism. Măiorescu sustains that the difference between science and philosophy appears strongly only at the extremes: at one pole there is the philosophy with a maximal degree of generalization and at the other one, which deals with the study of things in their individuality, there is science.

Between the two sides there are a series of intermediate positions, which ensure the passing from philosophy to science and the reverse. The author proposes a system of philosophy in which he distinguishes the following parts: a) the first and the most important is psychology, considered to be the science of mutual relationships between representations; b) the second is logic, defined as the science of the ratio between notions; c) the third is aesthetics, qualified as the science of beauty; it operates with aesthetical notions which presume human's reaction to life; in a straight sense aesthetics includes ethics; d) the fourth is metaphysics, which deals with the general notions philosophy operates with, such as: matter, movement, spirit, oneness, conscience, change, etc.

Preoccupied with the study of the fundamentals of knowledge, Măiorescu makes a distinction between the logical and the metaphysical sides of truth. In *Logic* (1887) the author develops the traditional problems of the theory of truth and also a series of principles connected to the formal rules of argument. He also provides an outstanding development of the methodology of science and of the criteria that stand at the basis of the classification of sciences. In this respect the author distinguishes three great categories of sciences: descriptive, experimental and demonstrative. The main difference among these three types of science is their varied degree of certainty. The descriptive sciences offer systematic knowledge and a kind of unity of knowledge

in a totality. The experimental sciences have a greater degree of certainty, they being able to establish laws among phenomena. By studying the unvaried and needed linkings among phenomena, Maiorescu writes, the experimental sciences could anticipate the evolution of processes and their possible changings and turnings. The highest level of certainty is handed by the demonstrative sciences of mathematics. Together with logic, they ensure the general and needed truths.

Referring to the philosophical problem of the origins of knowledge, he denies the thesis of pre-born ideas, which tries to support, more or less directly, the thesis of the existence of God. The point of view promoted by Maiorescu is that, one way or another, our ideas come from experience. Though the source of knowledge is in experience, the sensorial impressions are manufactured by the intellect. He says that through the power of apriorical categories, our brain models and harmonizes external impressions. Following Kant, Maiorescu is convinced of the superiority of the apriorical explanation in the problem of mathematical truths. The apriorical solution also establishes the basis of the certainty of the experimental sciences of nature, especially when speaking of causality. By drawing on apriorism, Maiorescu intended to prove, on one hand the value of the scientific knowledge and the universal and necessary character of scientific truth, and on the other hand –as apriorism limits the scientific knowledge to the phenomenal world– Maiorescu tried to avoid the materialism versus spiritualism binary way of thinking. He admits that, ultimately, the nature of the absolute can't be determined by the standard means of science. T. Maiorescu's philosophical view had at the beginning an anthropological character. Owing much to Feuerbach's influence, he considers man as the central figure of the world and the first being in the chart of existence, arguing that the notions of God and immortal soul do not resist to the test of rationality and they contradict the modern spirit of science. He explains the process of the building of the idea of God, showing that there was not God who created man as 'copy' of his own face and body, but rather each man creates a God of his own, according to his embodied mind. As a result, the idea of God is nothing but reflection of human aims and when we think of divinity we can't think of anything upper-human. Thus, the divine is something human and divinity is mankind. Maiorescu concludes that the learning

about God-theology-is in fact learning about man, that means anthropology.

He also criticized the thesis according to which man's essence comes from the "soul" which is viewed as an immaterial and immortal substance, that links ontologically each man to the divine spirits. Măiorescu sustains that whilst the immortality of soul has an individual, personal character, the intellect has a universal value. For this reason, there is no such thing as personal persistence after death, but only the eternal life of truth. He adds that not only truth but also all human general values are immortal. These values assure the essence of man, and, in the way we contribute to their promotion, we contribute to immortality.

The Romanian thinker points out that religion doesn't hold the hegemony of moral and that morality is inside of man, no matter if he is faithful or not. The reasonable moral is, in his opinion, superior to that built upon the immortality of soul and upon the idea of reward in heaven for the moral facts during earthly life. The social consequence of such an idea is that moral based on reality and on human aims directs one's energy towards the amelioration of life in this world.

Later, his philosophical view lost its general anthropocentric character.

Although Măiorescu is preoccupied with the whole problematic of the human being, the anthropocentric theme passes to a second plan. Man doesn't constitute any longer the ultimate problem of philosophy. Though he holds the first place in the chart of the forms of existence, his possibilities to change existence have become limited.

Măiorescu's reflections concentrated on some problems connected to the project of building a modern culture in Romania and promoting it in the world.

He stressed the idea that the social-cultural forms have an objective character and that the history of mankind constitutes a new order of reality. Man has the opportunity to interfere the development of society and culture, but this interfering is determined by peculiar historical backgrounds. As a result, the building of a modern culture must be connected organically to the social life in its entirety. Otherwise, Măiorescu thinks, it takes the risk to stay as a simple adornment, lacking functionality. He understood culture as an aspect of the social life and as a moment of its historical development. Culture doesn't receive

passively the influence of the social background but it acts itself upon these backgrounds. According to his view, the state depends on society so that the change of the civil society leads to the corresponding change of the state. Maiorescu developed the theory of the unity of substance and shape, criticizing superficial cultural fashions as mere shapes without substance. In his view, the substance consists of the economic, political and cultural activity of a nation. The substance has a determined position related to shape, which consists of its institutions.

Therefore, Maiorescu says, the shape should be built according to the substance. In his intention, this theory aims at the search of the conditions and possibilities to build the modern culture in Romania and its integration within the global cycle of values.

3. MATERIALISM, DETERMINISM AND EVOLUTIONISM IN VASILE CONTA'S VIEW

The general background of V. Conta's thought (1845-1882) was materialism. He didn't attempt to build a philosophical system, in the traditional sense of the word, but instead, he systematically examined the main problems of philosophy, contributing in this respect with a host of original ideas. Concerned with the nature of existence and with the relation between the self and the world, Conta aims to demonstrate the priority of the material world. The simple fact of the resistance our will overcome besides ourselves is a proof that the external world exists. His view stresses the idea that besides the material there is no other substance or any over-natural force in the world. At the same time, Conta sustained a natural explanation (by way of natural laws) rejecting, thus, the spiritual interpretations so often heard in his time. Among other things, he tries to unpack the mechanism of the psychic processes, by founding the so-called theory of "printings" made by the action of external objects upon the brain. The Romanian philosopher associates the theory of the structure of the material with the idea of its endlessness, drawing the conclusion of the lasting character of the features of the world. On these bases, he builds up the "hypothesis of the relative unity of the material". In his opinion movement is to be found in the material itself. Each unit of the material has the feature to move permanently into space and to influence, by its move, the move of other bodies. He rejects the idea of an absolute

rest, underlining the relative equality between the opposed forces of movement. In his explanations from *The Theory of Fatalism* (1894), Conta tried to establish the most general rules of movement, showing at the same time that the replacing of the shapes of the material follows certain laws "fixed and natural". He considered that those laws have a necessary character or, in his own words, a fatal character. The notion of fatal laws, fixed and natural is opposed by him to that of free choice. Fatality means, in his view, an absolute necessity to which the human will is subordinated. This notion is meant to underline a feature that laws have, that is the impossibility for them to be changed or overcome by the human will. In this respect, Conta develops a theory of fatality according to which the laws reflect the essential and permanent connections between phenomena and processes. He thinks it is not necessary for us to understand all the circumstances in which phenomena act in order to know their causal links, but instead, it is sufficient to decode only the main causes of phenomena to open the possibility of learning causal relationships.

Conta proposes a classification of laws according to their specificity, to their degree of complexity, and to the form of movement of the phenomena underwritten by them. He identifies the following groups: a) mechanical, physical, and chemical laws; b) proper biological laws; c) psychological laws and d) sociological laws. Related to the social laws, the Romanian thinker notices the complexity of the social phenomena that they seek to explain and the necessity of using statistical data in the study of social life. Therefore, when explaining some cases of the economical life of society, Conta succeeds in underlining the specificity of social determinism, sometimes going beyond metaphysical interpretations. The only difference between the social laws and the physical ones, he says, consists in the fact that the first are more complex, as we can not establish exactly the number of causes which generate social events.

In *The Theory of the Universal Wave* (1894-1895), the central reference for his philosophical view, Conta admits the progressive character of development, by saying that development is made by the collision of "some rival forces". At a metaphysical level, the Romanian philosopher considers the law of waving to be one of "the most general law of the material", having, thus, a universal application.

The universal law of waving appears as an attempt of spreading the principle of evolution, sustained by the natural sciences, over the entire world. In exposing the mechanism of this law, Conta shows that universal movement, or universal action, as he calls it, has two main forms: the fight between forces and the equilibrium of forces. In the table he draws, world is seen in a continuous moving and transformation, the bodies in their interactions, and the equilibrium of things only in a relative estate (*i.e.* it might be broken once).

The analysis of material forms leads the author to identify: a) the evolving forms (shapes) which grow up to a culmination point, and then decrease and disappear, and b) the non-evolving forms, such as revolutions, which are not subjected to 'evolution'. If the evolving forms are "universal and essential forms of the material", the non-evolving forms exist only because they "are needed for the regular evolution of the evolving forms". Conta calls the evolving forms "wave", a name which is based on an analogy between the evolving form and the wave. It must be added that the law of the universal waving can't be reduced only to an analogy, as the author's examples and explanations go further to describing a series of features of the waves: there are not two waves with the same shape; many times the rising wave is not alike to the shape of the descending curve; apart from principal and secondary waves there are endless intermediate waves, etc. He imagines a complex of waves connected to each other, so that from their succession result new shapes, which are developing, while the old ones are disappearing. Each wave, then, appears to be a step in the process of evolution. At the same time he admits that evolution is made through a succession of actions and reactions and that the new wave is born from the highest point of the former wave. Conta adds that the repetition takes place under the new circumstances and that the fight of contradictory forces assures the engine of development. The notion of wave suggests the idea that phenomena and material shapes represent passing processes, which appear, develop and disappear. Not only the evolution of each form is embodied within the shape of a wave system, but also the evolution of universe in its whole appears as a system of waves. Conta warns that the name "wave" has a conventional character, being of help to elaborate this theory of becoming. Also, in his metaphysical system, the law of assimilation suggests the idea that any given being

influences other beings it comes in touch with, according to the law of "universal attraction and repulsion".

The materialism, determinism and evolutionism of Conta's view represented the basis of promoting a philosophical criticism of religion. He considered religion to have its sources in man's ignorance and fear of the forces of nature, admitting at the same time, the opposition between science and religion. Conta is convinced that the progress of knowledge will eliminate religious sentiments and will promote truth, that nothing in the world is based on the free choice and that everything is done according to some absolutely fixed and necessary laws.

4. PETRE P. NEGULESCU - ON THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND METHOD IN THE EDIFICATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE

Negulescu (1872-1951) has viewed philosophy in close connection to science, considering that only in this way philosophy could give a coherent explanation of the universe in its wholeness. For this aim, the safest way is the constant use by philosophy of scientific knowledge. In other words, only the results obtained through scientific methodologies can constitute the basis for making valid theoretical constructions. Negulescu approached realistically the conceptual spaces between science and philosophy, admitting that between them there is a relationship of reciprocal influence and complementarity, which is made in the unique circumstances of human knowledge. In line with empiricism, Negulescu presumes that science builds a certain edifice by means of the experimental data and that the role of philosophy is "to examine these data in order to find their meaning and to legitimate them"¹. In his view, the function of philosophy is to build further the unfinished explanations of science and to complete them with hypotheses drawn according to the internal logic of the data of positive sciences. In this sense, he insists that the synthetical function of philosophy is to complete the circle of human knowledge by hypothesis on some fields inaccessible to experience. By combining the scientific spirit with the philosophical undertaking, Negulescu

1 Petre Negulescu, *Problema ontologica*, p. 332.

tackled some methods, which anticipate the strategies of the nowadays borderland subjects / interdisciplinary approaches.

To perform on nature, the Romanian philosopher admitted the materialistic unity of the world, the interactions of its phenomena and processes, but also their determinism. A wide documentary material from the history of philosophy and scientific knowledge sustains these conclusions. Following the development of views on determinism, the author analyses the appearance of some anti-deterministic ideas in the new branches of physics at the beginning of the XXth century. The doubts and uncertainties concerned to the peculiar determinism of atomic disintegration of the radioactive particles, Negulescu says, don't give us the right to believe that this phenomenon isn't caused by any reason. With regard to the "principle of uncertainty", which states the impossibility of the precise determination of the position of an electron, the Romanian thinker mentions that it is a matter of the limits of human knowledge and not at all of an indetermination of the movement of particles, movement which takes place according to some statistical laws. He notes that beyond the meeting by chance of some series or causal chains, in the universe there is a system of constant relationships, which generate structure and order. Promoter of evolutionist view, Negulescu denied the finalist solutions, which admit the existence of some supernatural forces or of an order principle that could be identified with the aim of the universe. In the form adopted by the author, evolutionism appears as a hypothesis of progressive becoming of all forms of existence. He contended that this view couldn't be denied either by science or by philosophy. Recognizing the reality of progress in social development, Negulescu attributed a decisive role in this development to psychological aspects. Researching the problem of progress according to positive facts, he maintained that the path of mankind does not follow a straight and uniform line. In his own expression, only a sinuous line with maximalities and minimalities can represent progress. Preoccupied with identifying the driving forces of progress, he elaborated a chart, in which he situates firstly intelligence and sensitivity, and then the social, natural, historical, economic, cultural and moral circumstances. His conclusion is that all in all it is human intelligence that causes the major changes of societies, pushing them further on the path of progress. It should be mentioned that, in

his opinion, progress consists in both the improvement of the conditions of human existence and in the development of human culture and civilization. Reconsidering the main moments of the progress of mankind, Negulescu directed his interest especially to the material conditions of existence. However, in his theoretical considerations he reduced the problem of the determining causes of development to intelligence and sensitivity. This theoretical option appears also in his explanations of culture and social progress. Thus, in the work *The genesis of the forms of culture* (1934), the aspects by which he explains social and cultural progress are those which build man's spiritual life: sensitivity and intelligence.

Beside these psychological facts, he admits that natural and social facts condition social progress and cultural life as well, but only as auxiliary forces. Negulescu's view engenders a deterministic and holistic perspective on social life, but in charting these facts he stresses the priority of intelligence and ideas. Nevertheless, he sustains the reality of progress and makes from the defense of reason a leading cause of his whole philosophy.

Similarly, when approaching the genesis of the forms of culture, the Romanian thinker starts from the thesis of the plurality of facts, both objective and subjective, (and both rational and non-rational), approach which makes his work of interest to the contemporary debates in philosophy and the social sciences.

5. "ENERGETICAL PERSONALISM" AND ITS SUPPOSITIONS

This philosophical project is connected with Constantin Rădulescu-Motru's name (1868-1957) and it is based on two fundamental aspects. On the one hand, the energetical view is associated with the scientific theory of energy, and particularly with the law of energy preservation and transformation. In his view, the notion of energy includes the results of the experimental research of modern science and ultimately the fundamental causal law of existence is just the law of energy. This shows us how natural phenomena interrelate and are mutually produced. On the other hand, the energetical thesis is considered the expression of a monistic philosophy that, in Motru's view, would overpass the duality matter-spirit. He adds the fact that the notion of energy serves in making

a bridge across the gap, which separates spirit from physical matter. In his view, energy is the ultimate and unconditioned reality of existence. These principles have been used by Rădulescu-Motru in founding psychology as an independent science, in Romania. We don't insist on his endeavors in this respect or on the proposed solution in explaining different phenomena and processes of psychical life.

What interest us here is the fact that all these helped him to elaborate a proper philosophical system embodied in a great work entitled "Energetical personalism" (1927). According to the view of "energetical personalism" the ultimate reality of the world is the person, and everything which exists is nothing but an element of the person's experience. Energetical personalism tries to prove the unity between spiritual reality and material reality, between consciousness and the physical universe. In the author's view, the subconscious phenomena and the unconscious phenomena condition the conscious psychical phenomena. Psychological unconsciousness illustrates, by itself, the transition from matter to soul. Without considering it, psychical conscious phenomena can't be explained and, on the other hand unconsciousness can't be differentiated from the neuro-physiological phenomena, which are material. The conclusion is the following: unconsciousness is one of the nearest conditions of conscience and the material is one of the furthest. Human personality results then from the convergence of the material condition through which the whole universe passed. Motru defines the view according to which spiritual life and material life are connected into a single chain of determinations, as energetical personalism.

The Romanian thinker considers the person to be the supreme shape of the representation of matter. Therefore one cannot understand the large universe without a previous understanding of personhood. The human person, term which in Motru's view is synonymous to personality, is not an unknown step in the causal chain. The universe has an imminent finality and its whole evolution is directed to the fulfillment of personality. The author stresses on the idea that the only satisfactory solution for the relationship between consciousness and universe is that of the realistic identity between both of them.

In order to demonstrate the genuine identity between the physical and the psychical, Motru employs the argument of evolution. But for

him the concept of evolution as a sustained change towards a progressive direction implies finalism.

– The postulate of the imminent finality doesn't mean, in his opinion, a denial of determinism. He says that the opposition appears only between "determinism by finality" and "determinism by causality". In other words, by his ability to anticipate awearly, the human person "breaks the code of a determinism by causality and causes a determinism by finality".² Rădulescu-Motru adds that the final act of energy is the human person, who includes in his / her experience the anticipation which changes the natural, biological and physical order of the universe into a personalistic order, based upon finality, which means the awareness of an aim. Consciousness then, is both an aim of the evolution and a result of it. In other words, it is the human person who indicates the direction of the evolution and how different energies of the universe are brought together.

The question Motru arises is about the genuine identity between consciousness and universe. It is not about an evolution from physical to psychical or from psychical to physical because, in this case, it would not exist a genuine identity. The explanation our philosopher gives is the following: consciousness as primitive function is identical to the fact or to the possibility of the evolution itself. By this, he suggests that any phenomenon or any system of relationships renders, in a way, the whole universe and sums up its whole evolution. Furthering this line of thought, neither consciousness nor human personality differ from other systems of co-relationships and it becomes only apparent that human consciousness derived and developed from difference. Having an evolving development as well, the universe itself has a consciousness. In Motru's opinion, the proper consciousness (or the human personality) differs from the other systems of relations or functions by the fact that it presents "an addition of adapting".

As an objective science, energetical personalism presupposes the thesis that personhood is a form of energy, who makes his / her own structure by relation with the other forms of energy of the universe.

² Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, *Personalism energetic si alte scrieri*, p. 247

Inside personality one distinguishes a biological side, depending on the cosmical medium and a spiritual side, depending on the history of mankind. Personality then, hasn't its origin in the isolated human being but in the structure of the whole mankind. Motru's explanation is that the human being only accomplishes personality's energies. The latter ones have a reality of species not of individuals, acting as worldly forms of energy. In order to build his theory of personality, Rădulescu-Motru uses the pair: self-personality. The self is at his origin an emotional intuition, defined as "structure of emotions". In his primitive shape, the self is the self-feeling produced inside the consciousness, bringing into it "a subjective order with a centripetal direction". Biologically, consciousness precedes the self, and it is around the self-made by conscience that one's personality develops and overpasses the individual sphere. The explanation proposed by the author is that the self is always subjective and connected to an individual consciousness, while the personality overpasses individuality and the more it rises the more objective it gets. In Motru's interpretation, the personality is bio-psycho-social while the self is only psychological. Although the self does not overpass the limits of individuality, it changes by the time the personality born around him rises, the emotional self thus becoming a rational self. On the background of the connection between self and personality lies experience. It simultaneously contributes to transform the intuitive self into a rational self and to build personality around self. The self acts only as regulator of the personality and does not contain inside the germs of personality. Furthermore, the self has an accidental character while the spiritual atmosphere in which it is produced conditions the personality.

Personality is a sequel to natural energies and, as a result, its role is greater when subordinating to the natural laws. As time goes by, new spiritual elements interfere in the sense of the self, allowing the evolution of human personality. The structures of human personality follow each other and among them there is possibility for coexistence.

We can explain then why the final personality acquires creativity, a feature through which it totally separates from the animal-biological line. The biological varieties of species are translated to the human being on the superior level of abilities, accumulated during individual's life, due to the creative preoccupations of the consciousness. For the

human being, work is a new way of difference, having a strong personalized character, as it becomes a necessary condition to ground a personality in its relationships with the background.

By the concept of work, Rădulescu-Motru has in view its professional level, sustaining that a certain type of professional activity corresponds to a certain type of personality that, in its internal awareness as a self, owes the blossoming of vocation. This is not only the ability to act originally and consciously, but also the desire and need to find fulfillment through work. Not each professional is a man of vocation, so society must cultivate such ability. In other terms, vocation could be enhanced by the general development of a society, but it could also be educated. In this way and also through knowledge of the self, Rădulescu-Motru concludes, even destiny could be corrected.

6. THE PROBLEM OF THE SCIENTIFIC RECONSTRUCTION OF PHILOSOPHY: MIRCEA FLORIAN'S POINT OF VIEW

Mircea Florian's philosophical work (1888-1960) promotes a rational way of thinking in order to rebuild philosophy in a scientific manner. He tries to define clearly the directing lines of a realistic philosophy focused on facts and experience. In the work "The Reform of logic" (1942), he tried to contribute to clarify the role of reason, accepting it only in its gnoseological side and in the manner in which it is confirmed by science. In this sense, M. Florian identifies rationalism with science and with knowledge generally speaking. He admits the supremacy of reason in the process of knowledge and as a possibility for science. Beside this role, reason would turn into a supreme god that would bring about just irrationality.

It is important to notice that the rationalism for which the Romanian thinker fights is tightly connected to realism. He has into view that type of realism which gives priority to the given objects and facts, to objective existence.

Rationalism should represent a possibility to clarify facts and to decode the peculiar structures of objects. In other terms, by rationalism we should understand two main things: a) knowledge through clear and distinguished ideas, opposed to obscurantist shapes of any kind, and b) knowledge through objective ideas, strongly verified by means

of experience. In the name of this realistic rationalism, he rejects the speculative rationalism that changes the thought into a maker of reality and that acts according to its own laws. To sum up the ideas expressed so far, realism - directed towards given facts and objects, and gnoseologic rationalism constitute the fundamental coordinates of M. Florian's philosophy. Starting on from these principles, he deals with a wide philosophical agenda, centred nevertheless on the sphere of knowledge.

To these, it is added the methodological principle, simply, yet provokingly defined by the author as "criticizing". In line with Kant, the Romanian thinker appreciated the critical method to mean both the strong analysis of the premises of philosophy, of its fundamental postulations, and the refusal to accept solutions without a preable testing of the (un)reasonable elements they contain.

One of the important thesis of M. Florian's philosophy is that ontology subordinates knowledge. This point of view is sustained at different levels of the argument. For instance, in logic, he admits that the laws of logic are the laws of objects and not at all the laws of a "reasonable" subjective structure.

Referring to the forms of thinking, he insists on their belonging to objects, admitting that there are no "relationships without supports" and that the form is a principle of order, which has sense only when connected to whatever is ordinated. On this challenging background of ideas, the Romanian philosopher builds a realist ontology, which, mainly, supposes: to maintain knowledge in the sphere of reality, to check reality by experience and the possibility of its scientific knowledge, the priority of the 'real' in the relationship with the self and with thought.

These problems are reviewed and developed in the volume "The philosophical reconstruction" (1944), structured around three themes: a) the proper datum, b) the definition of philosophy and c) the experience. In dealing with the philosophical datum, he tries to explain the relationships between the datum and the thought and the problem about the sameness of the datum with the empirical given. His view is that the philosophical datum is not peculiar and specific but "the given in all its generality". By this solution, M. Florian considered that he found out a starting point of maximal generality, lack of prejudices

and, at the same time, neutral in connection to the directions of thought sustained by materialism and idealism.

According to this view, philosophical attempts should start from the generally given, a notion that includes existence in its entirety. The Romanian thinker points out that existence includes both the real objects and the unreal and neutral objects. He considers everything that is represented, thought or felt, to be something given, that means an object of knowledge. The given, generally speaking, has the advantage that it could be accepted by anyone, as no one can wonder if something is given or not. The existence of the datum seems to M. Florian as something that imposes from outside, and thought cannot overcome it. Trying to decode the components of the datum, the author identifies it with the object, which is identified with the existence on the whole. He insists to add that object, just like existence, cannot be reduced to what is called reality, simply because it refers only to a certain existence. In this sense, M. Florian defines objects from the vantagepoint of knowledge, *i.e.* the same way he has already defined the datum. He establishes three categories of objects: a) real objects (bodies or souls) b) unreal objects (of imagination, of fantasy, etc.) and c) sur-real or neutral objects.

The objects from the last category are not about real / unreal, but could be found in both fields. Among them, the author includes the "formal" objects of mathematics and logic, and also the relationships, which cannot be real or unreal, in their own, but only according to the notions they refer to.

M. Florian tried to demonstrate "the transcendence" of all categories of objects tackled into the proposed division, including the unreal and sur-real objects. In other words, he intended to show that the ontological has a wider sphere than the real by explaining why the unreal and sur-real objects, like existence in its own, are ontological values.

The assemble of these ideas was included in a synthetical ontological project, called by M. Florian Recessivity as structure of the world. The work, published posthumous, proposes a general theory of the structure of existence, of knowledge and of values. The author asks himself how the production of novelty is possible in a universe that seems to be understood only by repetition and identity. Going

deeper into this experience, M. Florian comes to identify a fundamental relation among being, knowledge and value, relation called 'recessivity' and raised to the level of transcendence, of super-principle of categorical reconstruction of philosophy.

In M. Florian's view, reality or the universal structure of the given is composed as a multitude of oppositions, each of them being a "dualism". In its essence, "the recessive duality" is underlined by the existence of two contradictory, yet necessarily connected facts, one dominating the other. The terms of each opposition have not an equal power, they do not derive one from another and do not reflect each other. The author explains that although all the time one of them leads the other, the second, 'leaded' fact has a higher existential significance. For instance, physical matter dominates spirit, but the later has a major significance. The relation is not, after all, one typical of a hierarchy, either from the point of view of value, or from that of chronological order.

The author contends that recessivity stands apart from the other types of relations qualified as fundamental: contradiction, duality, complementarily, the possible-real relationship, etc. Recessivity as relation between two terms, of which one is dominating and the other is recessive, must not be understood as a link of causality, or as a degradation from the ontological or valuable point of view of the second. Both terms are equally needed and necessary: they are linked without destroying one another. By means of them, the complex structure of existence or of knowledge is plotted from an asymmetrical view that characterizes the architecture of the world. In this manner, recessivity solves the dualistic problem, differing, at the same time, from the so-called "superior synthesis".

M. Florian thinks that the determinants of the recessive principle subscribe to what Aristotle's logic named trans-categories (the opposing anterior-posterior [previous-following], the move and its species). This concept founded the problem of transcendence ("existence as existence"), of being as background for existence and of the unity of the determinated beings. According to the Romanian philosopher, the principle of recessivity is meant to build up a new transcendence in order to characterize the way of constructing categorial relations, which describe (theoretically) existence, knowledge and value.

7. LUCIAN BLAGA - THE CONDITIONS FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE

The philosophical system of Lucian Blaga (1895-1961) is usually defined as spiritualist metaphysics, being considered one of the most original of Romanian thought. As in any metaphysical system, the author privileges certain principles of organizing and charting the components of existence. Blaga situates the word "mystery" at the very center of his project, any other spiritual attempt being nothing else but a tensional challenge with the mystery. In its wholeness, world is dominated by an infinity of unknown or mysteries, which have not come and will never come into 'touch' with knowledge.

Mystery includes the existence in its entirety and represents, at the same time, a stimulus for, and a form of, human knowledge. By art, religion or philosophy, the human being desires a revelation of the mystery, but "the transcendental prohibition" settled by the "Great Anonymous" is a trap for all attempts of conceiving. All on all, mystery represents, according to the Romanian thinker, the supreme angle of view of a philosophical training that wishes neither to penetrate the mystery, nor to simply notice it. The concept of mystery is associated with what our philosopher calls 'The Great Anonymous', a kind of metaphysical center of existence, acting as "guardian" of knowledge. It forbids us to enter the dense network of mysteries. It follows on from here that, in fact, there is a central existential mystery – the Great Anonymous – and the deriving mysteries, which the first one keeps under its control and initiation. The Great Anonymous engenders the attributes of an absolute metaphysical factum, being the primary centre of creation, the supreme prohibitory, the settlement of the absolute and super-logical knowledge of existential mysteries.

According to Blaga, the Great Anonymous performs more than meregnoseological functions, being also an ordinary existential factum with cosmological generating functions. The Great Anonymous, then, could have a double explanation connected to the cognitive attitude of the subject. On one hand the Great Anonymous might be understood as a metaphorical calling for the way in which the absolute appears to the human intellect. On the other hand, it unfolds as a metaphysical instance of existence and as genestic principle of the world. In 'The Cosmological Trilogy', Blaga writes that the Great Anonymous is a

"unitary entirety" of a maximal substantial and structural complexity. This is an existence that suffices to itself, being something different from the world. The thesis sustained by the author is that the Great Unknown isn't a trapping factum only in connection to the human being's cognitive attempts, but also in a strictly existential plan. In connection to itself and against its creating power, the Great Unknown increases its proper reproductive possibilities.

In other words, the Great Anonymous' will is not directed towards creation but it has as objective just to avoid a too great generating power. In this respect, Blaga identifies the following phases of the cosmical genesis (due to the Great Anonymous): the pre-cosmical phase, equivalent to the maximal limitation of the generating possibilities of the Great Anonymous; the phase of the direct genesis of differences, considered as heterogeneous and homogenous existences; the phase of the indirect genesis, in which takes place the cosmical integration of the divine differences³. From this place, the Great Anonymous establishes the cosmos (the outerspace) by reproducing itself, being careful not to generate systems of a complexity equivalent to its own. It needs to be added that divine differences are equivalent of certain last entities from the substantial and structural entirety, carrying some structures of maximal simplicity.

Blaga explains the fact that divine differences results of some generating acts, willingly denatured, in order to avoid the decentralization of existence.

As viewed by the author, divine differences are anything but a closed world, for they dwell at the antipode of the concept of microcosm. The idea suggested by this judgement is that they are able to produce the image of a world only because they are integrated and organized.

Analyzing the human being's condition, as related to the Great Anonymous, Blaga notices an apparently contradictory situation: the human being is the nearest to the Great Anonymous by the nature of the divine differences from his construction but, at the same time, antithetical to It. In the Romanian thinker's view, The Great Unknown

³ L. Blaga, *Trilogía Cosmológica*, p. 31.

is afraid of human being's resemblance with It and therefore It takes cautions so as he / she (the human being) could not fulfil himself by knowledge and power.

The peculiarity of human existence is given by the fact that the human being dwells in two totally different horizons. The first ontological mode is the human's existence in a specific world, given for his self - preservation. The second refers to the human's existence inside the horizon of mystery, in order to reveal to himself / herself this mystery. Whilst the first ontological mode is common to animals, the second mode is specifically human and it represents a step forward towards the horizon in which the conscious being becomes a builder of history. In the author's view, history is a development of human energies and intentions, which are ever against the purpose. The possible conclusion is that human being is an imperfect creation of a Supreme Being, who does not reveal his mysteries and whom the human being, has always been interested in.

In confronting existential mysteries, human knowledge is reached alongside two fundamental paths: Heavenly knowledge and luciferical knowledge. According to Blaga's explanation, these division starts from the controversies of Knowledge as philosophical problem. Synthesizing the explanation proposed by the author, we can outline the following specific notes:

- a) Heavenly (or Paradisiacal) knowledge is a type of knowledge whose object is given and whose main aim is to integrate the object into a conceptual plan. It is a knowledge attached to, and fixed by, object, based on intuition, but which uses abstraction and imagination. It has a positive, unproblematic, determination, owing the vocation of certainty and strength. For this reason, it suffices itself, it does not need other cognitive instances for self-legitimization. As a distinct way of knowledge, Blaga says, the Paradisiacal (Heavenly) knowledge progresses extensively into unknown and it is achieved by a numerical reducing of mysteries, by discovering some new objects.
- b) Luciferical knowledge detaches itself from the object, without leaving it at all. It is situated at the level of mysteries, because it aims to break the inner-balance of the object. Luciferical knowledge approaches the object from the perspective of the crisis which it

itself causes to the object, opening, thus, a mystery.⁴ Without this idea of mystery associated to luciferical knowledge, the human being, Blaga says, would miss the most complex way of knowledge. The main feature of this type of knowledge is the problem connected to the crisis of object. Luciferical knowledge gets to the rightness the object lacks (besides what is given), to a hidden side. That's why, the solving of a problem within Luciferical knowledge is only apparent. The author's explanation is that the object of Luciferical knowledge has a accessible side-"the fanic"-and a hidden side-"the cryptic" of the open mystery. Therefore, this type of knowledge has as a fundamental fact the opening of the mystery in order to reveal it, progressively.

- c) The passing from "the fanic" of an open mystery to the "cryptic" is made by means of a step consisting in "a theoretical idea" that Blaga admits that is excepted from any possible checking. The theoretical idea is that which causes the internal tension of a problem by its content, that means it comes into controversy with the given material, or the fanic. Any abstract idea, law or category that has the above-mentioned condition might accomplish the theoretical function. According to the system of thought promoted by Blaga, the world has apart from rational elements, numerous non-rational sides. The solution given to this problem of knowledge is "the dogmatic method" the only one able to include "in terms" the mystery of the existence. As a way of thinking, the dogma is tightly connected to transcendence and knowledge. Blaga's explanation is that dogmatic refers to a position of accepting a transfigured antinomy as a final expression of a mystery. In this sense, the dogmatic method deals with the super-logical transcendental but uses in its attempts categories and concepts in the form of some transposed antinomies.

The author goes on by building the idea that dogma will reach the value of a principle of knowledge and rebuilding the world inside a new era, or Dogmatic Eon, as Blaga calls it. His approach properly considers the epistemological reliability of dogmatic as way of thinking, or as

⁴ L. Blaga, *Trilogía cunoasterii*, p. 159.

type of ideation. However, the explanation given to dogma does not necessarily imply contents of religious knowledge. It follows then that dogmas may be researched from a pure intellectual position and for strict philosophical aims. This understanding of dogma has certain constitutive features, independent of the field of its use, so, dogma may have a hidden sense, inaccessible to human wisdom in its natural circumstances of functioning. Finally, the dogmatic synthesis seems to replace a postulated solution whose aim is to stress a transcendent "something", non-understandable by intellect and un-built by intuition, as the great philosopher admits.

8. THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN EXISTENCE IN D. D. ROSCA'S WORK

D. D. Rosca's philosophical thought (1895-1980) is an attempt of dialectical synthesis between rationalism and humanism in which we also find a series of existential motifs. In a work of reference for his view -*The Tragic Existence* (1934)- the author draws an original system of ideas focused on an always relevant philosophical theme: the sense and aim of human existence. The work appears in a historical period characterized by the polarity of the main philosophical trends: on the one hand, the influence of neo-positivism is strongly felt and so is that of epistemological relativism, which rejects the human problematic away from philosophical interest; on the other hand, there is the rise of some irrational and obscurantist trends which pray the instinctual and unconscious forces of the human being.

One of the tenets of Rosca's philosophy is the contradictory character of human existence. He explains the concept of tragic existence through the reality of not-obeying cultures, that generates a tragic consciousness. This causes the highest internal tension the human being can ever reach: it is the consciousness of an existence that always feels in conflict with the world.

The tragic consciousness makes from insufficiency and even from misfortune a spring of creation. It is an ever unsatisfied and unquiet consciousness, which refuses to accept the existential datum as implacable destiny. In this respect, the author writes that "the tragic

feeling of existence, the metaphysical woe and the great spiritual tension-very little differing aspects of the same deep and permanent affectionate estate of consciousness -are a spring of great spiritual force". He also admits that this spiritual force is the creator of the greatest spiritual freedom the human being could reach in this world. As the Romanian philosopher defined it, it is about "active freedom, able to transform the world, and not passive freedom or simple rebellion".⁵

According to his interpretation, the human destiny aims to acquire paradoxical character, which could be defined by the contradictory phrase of the 'optimistic tragic'. The solution seen by D. D. Rosca is that a tragic existence can save itself from the pessimistic tragic only by changing into a cultural existence. In this respect, the author points out some significant details:

- the modern ideal of life, no matter how different from whatever exists, stays as a linking factor which gives shape and aim to life;
- the cultural values, as intellectual and affective values, are the sole values to give sense to human existence and social progress;
- the philosophical attitude, the interest and preoccupation in philosophy should be considered components of the ideal (of) life; these could indicate both a certain standard of cultural maturity and a sign of crisis, with added value for culture;
- cultural creation and action is the constructive manner in which the human being can live his / her tragic existence; cultural existence is tragic because it is founded on a set of inevitable human contradictions, and it is optimistic because creation founds a register of values of human existence;
- the aims and the value of human existence are built between mobile parameters of affirmation and negation, of existing realities and idealistic worlds, of the knowledge of the facts of intelligence and the charting of values as work of the consciousness;
- cultural consciousness is in its fundamental articulation both cognitive and axiologic ; hence, it is necessarily philosophical; in

⁵ D. D. Rosca, *Existenta tragica*, p. 185.

order to acquire such a consciousness, the human spirit need to overpass the necessary steps of knowledge and experience;

- philosophical culture discovers the human being's temptation for wholeness and holistic visions of the entirety; the facts of scientific culture answer the human being's needs of giving consistency to projects, of striving to reach the absolute and the new zones of the unknown. The author considers the existence of a hypothetical intelligence that includes at a certain moment the whole knowledge, a substitution of scientific thought by philosophical thought. D. D. Rosca calls this the myth of the entire rationality-in the sense that world could be rational, and hence understandable in its final and total essence. This statement of entire rationality of reality is more than a mere theoretical support operating all the time in pure ideas: it is an affective-emotional support as well. In the author's explanation, the philosophical image of the world is never made by theoretical reasoning only, but also by the affective and axiologic projections of the human soul. At last, this manner of relating the human being to the world contains also a moral consequence: the world is not fully understandable (cognitively speaking), as it is also built related to the human being, according to certain scales of values.

D. D. Rosca admits that, by its aims, philosophy lies on a background of knowledge channeled on the explanation and the comprehension of the world in its wholeness. Furthermore, the metaphysical attitude is included within a deep sentimental level of the consciousness, related with lived existence through an attempt to summarize the facts of experience. As other spiritual fields, metaphysics springs from the need to take attitude towards existence and the Romanian thinker goes further to identify the following types of attitudes: a) total absence, in fact, the non-attitude; b) naive optimism, synonymous with the idea of an aim directed towards the "well-being" of the world and of human actions; c) pessimism, associated with the idea of senselessness, translated into states of despair and inability; d) the spectacular attitude, equivalent to mere interest for appearances, without a moral support; e) the heroic attitude, situated beyond optimism and pessimism; the latter is at the same time optimistic and pessimistic, and represents the source of the tragic awareness of existence.

A first conclusion then, is that we should never take for granted the experience in any sense, but accept it as equally realistic, under its both aspects. The philosopher is eager to warn that experience is not fully understandable and (somehow) is also absurd. It might have sense, but it could also be senseless.

Another conclusion is that the world has not been and will never be the embodiment of a paradisiac ideal. The truth and the non-truth, the value and the non-value, the justice and the injustice are confronting, equally, on the side of good and evil. Our fate and the destinies of the civilizations we created are within the confines of this tragic conflict, which act among us as two opposite principles. This antagonism, co-substantial to existence, causes tragic feeling and metaphysical worries. For some of us these could become source of disappointment, for others, they could become power forces.

For us, D. D. Rosca concludes, it is important to know how to make of internal tension a positive inner-force directable towards the solving of the unsolved problems and a resource for the fulfillment of consciousness.

9. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE CONTROVERSIAL PROBLEM OF VALUES

T. Vianu's philosophical preoccupations (1897-1964) focused upon the general problems of culture, aesthetics and the theory of values. To be sure, the foundations of his view have been synthesized in the following works, which became leading references in the Romanian philosophical literature:

"Aesthetics" (1934), "Introduction in the theory of values founded on the observation of conscience" (1942) and "The Philosophy of Culture" (1944). For the aim of this study we will analyze especially the author's contributions to the foundation of the philosophy of culture and the theory of values, areas considered at that time novel fields of research in Romanian philosophy.

The main ideas promoted in his work could be summarized as follows:

- a) By its specificity, the philosophy of culture belongs to the spiritual sciences, whose distinctive sign is the study of phenomena related to value. It differs from the sciences of culture, however, by the

higher degree of generalization. In this circumstance, Vianu admits that the consisting elements of the notion of culture are: the culture will, with which are associated a certain pathetism of the soul and a certain moral energy; the optimistic faith in the themes which have always been of human interest; the value that directs this energy; the cultural good in which value is included; the cultural subjective event which gives value to the cultural goods; the cultural objective event which includes the value into a material. The author attributes an outstanding role to value, because it directs the cultural will, it embodies a cultural good, and the appreciation of the cultural goods is made from a necessarily value-laden vantagepoint.

- b) Related to the sphere of values, culture could be conceptualized in two registers. On one hand, it is partial, since it focuses on a certain set of values. On the other hand, it is total, meaning that it is related to the whole of values. If one considers the number of beings to whom it is applied, culture is either individual or social and from here then, one can separate the individual culture (partial or total) and the culture of society.

T. Vianu agrees that the difference (and the reciprocal autonomy) of the theoretical, aesthetical, economic, moral, juridical, religious, values must be remembered, because it has contributed to the progress of modern culture. The solution to the crises of culture is given both by the possibility of the individual consciousness to include all values and by the existence of a central theme in modern culture. The author supports the possibility of the individual consciousness to regain the whole perspective upon the world through a theory of the structure of the soul. This is understood as a configuration within which could unfold both conflicts between values, due to the exclusive preoccupation for the value that leads the respective structure, and communication between these surrounding values. The author is convinced that the blossoming of the value which dominates the soul structure of a being and which resembles the field in which it acts, could open him/her perspectives to other values.

- c) Vianu considers ideals to be the main facts leading the process of culture over long periods. Ideals are upper-ordinated values or aims

of superior quality, in connection with 'proper' values. In this respect, he distinguishes two types of ideals: rationalist and historic. The first has as features the general-human value of reason, the progressivism that results from associating reason with equalitarianism (seen as a natural datum and a manner of distributing reason among all beings). The historic conception of the cultural ideal maintains the existence of a plurality of differentiated cultures according to their autonomous ideals. They have as background the nations and they represent closed cycles, heterogeneous within themselves and homogenous when seen from outside. The fulfillment of ideals is regulated by certain conditions. The first of them is the cosmical environment which, in order to generate culture, should be connected to the representation of certain purposes. The second condition is the economical determination and it takes place at the level of the social cultural process. Finally, under the influence of the natural, social, cultural environment there are born, in the human soul, permanent accommodations of life which create culture, in a national sense, qualified by the author as racial conditioning. Besides these material conditions of culture, T. Vianu identifies a series of spiritual conditions such as: tradition, which acts through institutions, education and imitation; the size of the social group, which generates differences among the influences made by tradition; the importance a ruling value has in a cultural field, etc.

When testing the rationalist and historic conceptions of cultural ideas, the author admits a series of shortcomings. He opposes to them an alternative, defined as activist. Whilst the rationalist conception proposes as ideal for culture the improvement of reason, the activist conception proposes as many purposes as the man's creative activity can assume. Similarly, while the historic conception looks like a result of the cosmic, social and economic environment, according to activist alternative, the action that generates culture receives the supreme expression of human freedom. According to this meaning, the activist ideal is similar to the process of the cultural creation specific to the human being.⁶

⁶ T. Vianu, *Studii de filosofie a culturii*, págs. 319 y 320.

d) The Romanian thinker settles the values in an intermediate zone, situated between consciousness and things; it is autonomous and, at the same time, possible only together with the two realities. The autonomy of values from consciousness is viewed in the sense that they aren't made by the latter, but only included in it. The existence of the axiologic environment gives values a state of objectivity and of relative autonomy from both consciousness and things. Values have certain constancy, in the sense that man has not given up 'usefulness', 'vitality', 'legality', 'political power', 'truth', 'beauty', 'good' and 'saint' as core values. These values build a system, which could be seen either as closed system (if we bear in mind that along the history of culture there haven't been added other values to the 'constant' economic, juridical, political, theoretical, aesthetical, moral and religious values) or as open system (if we refer to the contents which could be take into account in relation to this structure). The fundamental thesis the Romanian philosopher proposes to the philosophy of values is the establishment of the general axiologic frame, which implies the stability of the human consciousness and of the fundamentals of culture. In this explanatory choice, values seem to be permanent ideal patterns in which the creative acts are achieved. T. Vianu began in the Romanian philosophy the systematic analysis of axiology.

In those circumstances, he proposed a charting of values in a coherent system.

The first criterion of this endeavor pertains to the type of proper support (the personal, real, material and spiritual good) and the relation of value with it (e.g. it could be of joining, that means connection to more supports).

The second criterion refers to values-means and values-aims. The last ones, when serving a means for achieving other values acquire a relative character.

According to the impact or echo of values upon consciousness, there could be differentiated: persuading values, which assure the purchasing into being the desirable subject, and the amplifying values, which fuel the rising, enriching, identifying or purifying of the human being. The author admits that value has a reasonable surface, meaning that it could be reduced to general facts and that it could be described.

At the same time, value lacks an irreducible nucleus that becomes object of internal experience. Vianu synthesizes the types of values and their rational coordinates into a table that includes the following types of values: economic, vital, juridical, political, theoretical, aesthetical, moral and religious.

Furthermore, he identifies the following determinant principles of values (1982, p. 104):

- the personal values are superior to the real values;
- the spiritual values are superior to the material values;
- the aim-values are superior to the means-values;
- the rising values are superior to the persuasive values;
- the integrating values are superior to the un-integrating values;
- the integrative values are superior to the integrating values;

According to Vianu, the system of values is open at the inter-typical level, where there is the possibility to acquire new contents and significations.

10. A PATTERN OF ONTOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION AND ITS COGNITIVE RELEVANCE

In building his ontological project, Constantin Noica (1909-1980) makes use of a triadic scheme: body-soul-spirit, imagining it belongs to the being properly. Obviously, this conceptual trinity is due to the constitution of the human being. In order to avoid possible misunderstandings, the author explains the thesis that the human being is according to the image and the resemblance of the Being, which means, he has a body and a soul, but also a spirit, because before him, the Being has such a constitution. Developing this reasoning, Noica speaks of the being's three ontic levels, according to body, soul and spirit.

There can be remembered the following features:

- the being's body is considered the first being, or the being of the real things;
- the soul belongs to the second being, and refers to the being of the elements which cause the "becoming";
- the being's spirit expresses the third being or the being as being.

In order to get the picture of the entire reality of the world, Noica adds to his theoretical construction other two levels. Firstly, is the pre-

being, to whom belong the chaos and the ontological shortcomings and then is the un-being, seen not as opposite to being but only a zone of going out the being.

The Romanian thinker gives to un-being the role of "catching" at the end of each level, because, he says, the un-being is always an un-being of a certain something. And not only this! Death might occur for both the achieved things and the unachieved things, and so might happen to all elements, or finally, to even being as being.

This successive levels aside, the being also has an inner-structure called by Noica ontological model. This is built of three terms-individual, determining, general (I-D-G) and there is even where we cannot speak of being, in the real sense. The model can "walk" over the being's levels, in this way succeeding in separating the pre-being from being. In the author's explanation, not everything which exists is, that means that only those things or beings are true in which the model was achieved by all his three terms. Noica develops the theory according to which within the primary disorder (which included a lot of individualities, determiners and generalities) at a certain moment occurred a couple of two terms of the ontological model. Thus, it emerged a weak being or a rudimentary being, called by the author "ontological shortcoming". In his view, the ontological shortcoming corresponds to an intermediate step between disorder, specific to chaos, and order, specific to being. In other words, the ontological shortcoming is neither chaos (not any longer), nor proper being. It is an opening towards being and it unfolds in six ways, their sum resulting from combining each two terms from the I-D-G trinity.

Giving up to the combinations in which the coupled terms are identical, one obtains the following ontological shortcomings: I-D; D-G; G-I; I-G; G-D; D-I.

Summing it up, the project made by Noica includes the following features:

- a) The ontological principle is at the same time a fundament of knowledge. The embodiments or the instants of the Being's presence are: the Being of things the becoming; the Being as element -the secondary being; the Being as being. The three levels of the being's presence are rationally determined in a different way: the being inside things -by categories; the being of the elements -

through a certain type of categories, called categories of real things, the being itself- which can't be pointed out.

- b) The ideas concerned with the status of "the being's model" are those which give, most directly, the sense of the principle in Noica's metaphysical view. "Even if it has not an independent reality, Noica writes, the model stands, however, for what is more real in them, than they themselves". The being's model or the ontological model should be mainly understood as transcendental.
- c) Being a simple schema and not a foundation, the being inside things should not be searched-either in transcendent or in transcendental, but in the things themselves. The being inside things is the becoming which in turn is itself closing which opens, but one of secondary type, the author says. The becoming underlines the being's terms, the organization and the dynamism of structure, while the being, as an organized structure gives the real fulfillment of the becoming.
- d) The element or the secondary being represents the order from reality "in which are fulfilled the things and which makes them be".⁷ In addition, the elements are, simultaneously, foundation of being and knowledge. Noica insists that the level of elements is subdued to becoming, they grow together with its becoming and with the historical becoming. This explanation allow us to re-define the real either as a "cutting" in the continuum of the being, or as an element (or a crossing of elements).
- e) Elements build another type of universe different from that of things, which, however, is not in other place and is not estranged from this universe. Noica proposes some categories in order to give reason to elements: a multiple one, the open totality, the limitation that does not limit, the autonomic community, real-possible-necessary.
- f) Whereas the being of things and the being of elements could be discussed phenomenologically, the third instance of the being need be approached analogically. The final being or the final sense of the being could be suggested by phrases such as: being as being is a unique distribution of the One or multiple One is that in which the multiple itself is in fact one. This metaphysical thought, peculiar

⁷ C. Noica, *Ratiunea filosofica romaneasca*, p. 333.

to Noica, brings us back to the criterion of the being and to the observation that the being hasn't existence, properly, but only possible embodying.

- g) In last analysis, the truth about being is described by ontology and ontological general theory should start with the becoming related to being or "becoming into being". In this respect, Noica notices four forms of becoming into being: the subjective becoming into being of human being as a person; the objective becoming of the human communities; the absolute becoming of human into a whole; the becoming into being of human together with the whole rest.

Thus, C. Noica's ontology constitutes a program that proposes a new paradigm of philosophical construction, not surprisingly considered one of the most interesting intellectual developments in XXth century Romania.

11. CONCLUSIONS

Nobody with presence of spirit can miss a fundamental aspect arising of these alternative philosophical projects: the history of the philosophical thought looks like a permanent cognitive process which is always unfolding from the ancestors' truths and from those discovered by our contemporary. Such a view of philosophical knowledge gives us reason to appreciate a thinker's value through his / her contributions to the progress of philosophy, no matter whether it is about the discovery of new truths, the novel definition of philosophical categories, the approach of new research problems, or the innovative reformulation of research methodologies. I should say, eventually, that this undertaking through the history of philosophy makes us understand why a certain thinker was able to discover nothing but only partial truths and to admit that the whole truth never becomes accessible to any particular thinker.

But each thinker has his / her own contribution in the development of philosophy and at the same time his / her own historical contingencies, which allow for, and require, a continuous work of reappraisal, an incessant dwelling in an epistemic space that opens novelty provided that the existing repositories of knowledge accomplish their roles. I hope that this analysis has brought about the idea that

the 'real' history of philosophy cannot store only the views appreciated, at a certain moment, as positive. On the contrary, it should also pay appropriate attention to those theories that represented less successful experiments, mere trying in the search for the ascendant path of philosophical knowledge. I would dare to contend that even those views and theories which proved to be wrong have had the merit of helping the rise of novel and robust hypotheses and arguments, and sometimes, of opening the way to new possibilities of major philosophical reconstructions.

To conclude, the present work was able to prove that, beyond the sinuosity of history, the Romanian thought of the XXth century was situated in a progressive horizon, contributing to the collective emancipation and creative affirmation of the Romanians, in spite of (or due to) their cultural marginality, which has fuelled provoking hybridization and crossings of ideas, intellectual fashions, or systems of thought. ❁

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